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IN THE SUPREME C.QURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,
Case No.
-vs.-

7899

DOX FEDDER,
Appellant.

S·TATEMENT OF FACTS
Guilt of the defendant, Don Fedder, is not at issue in
the case at bar. Appellant bases this app·eal upon procedural errors which allegedly arose during the trial and
probation of the defendant.
On the 27th day of November, 1950, an Information
was filed in the District Court of the Second Judicial
District', State of Utah, charging the defendant, Don
Fedder, with two others, with the crime of violating s:ection 103-36-12, Utah Code Annotated 1943, a felony. (Tr.
9-Suppl. Tr. 3, 4).
On December 4, 1950, defendant entered a plea of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"not guilty" to the Information. ( Tr. 10-Suppl. Tr. 5).
This plea was changed to "guilty" on F'ebruary 28, 1951,
after which the defendant was incarcerated and the case
referred to the Probation Department, sentence to be in1~
posed March 19th, 1951. (Tr.ll-SuppL Tr. 6).
March 19th, 1951, trial court, based on the· defendant's plea of guilty, placed the defendant on probation
with the Adult Probation Department and ordered hlin
to sign a Probation Agreement. Defendant was also
ordered to ohey all orders issued by the Probation Department ·during his probation period. The defendant acknowledged and consented in open court to sign the aforementioned agreement.
Imposition of sentence was continued from March
19th to April 30th, to August 13th, to November 19th.
(Suppl.~ Tr. 7, 11) The defendant appearing and pursuant to favorable reports from the Probation Department, imposition of sentence was- continued each time.
Further continuances were had from November 19th to
November 26th, to December 3rd, to D·ecember 17th and
. December 24, 1951. These continuances were granted by
the court because the defendant failed to appear as
ordered. (Suppl. Tr.13, 14, 15, 16) On December 24,1951,
a bench warrant was issued for the defendant's arrest.·
(Suppl. ~r. 17)
On June 2., 1952, James. A. Larson, District Agent
of the Adult Probation Department filed an affidavit with
the District Court in which he alleged the defendant had
violated · the terms of his probation and requested the
court terminate said probation. (Tr. 20, 21). Based

I. 1I
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upon the affidavit, an Order to Show Caus.e was issued
whereby defendant "'"as ordered to ap·pear on June 30,
1952, to sho-\v cause 'vhy his probation should not he
revoked and sentence imposed. (Tr. 22)
June 20th, defendant's attorney filed Objections and
Motion to Quash, Set ~:\.side and Vacate the Order to
Show Cause. (Tr. 23, 24, 25, 26) Afte~ argument of
counsel, on June 30th, the motion was denied. Thereupon
July 3rd "~as set as time for hearing on the Affidavit In
Reply to Order to Show Cause filed by the defendant.
('Suppl. Tr. 18, 19, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30)
On July 3rd, afte~ having heard evidence, the court
found that defendant had violated the Probation Agree~.
ment and revoked his Order of Parole and issue:d a
Bench Warrant for defendant's arrest. (Sup·p·l. Tr. 24Tr. 32, 33) The trial was continued until July 7th for
imposition of sentence at which time the defendant again
failed to appear.
On July 14, 1952, the trial court filed the written
Order.after the aforementioned hearing and stated therein that the defendant violated .the terms of his p-robation
and the trial court proceeded to find the defendant guilty
of the crime charged. (Tr. 35, 36)
App~llant asserts, as one of his main arguments, that
inasmuch as the court failed to specify th~. terms of p·robation, the court lost jurisdiction ove! the person of the .
defendant to subsequently find that he had violated his
probation and to impose sentence. Ap~peilant bases his
argument on· the ground that the minute entries of said
court do not reveal the terms and condition~ o~ probation
3
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and as a result, appellant asserts that he was not placed
on probation hut rather was released outright.
The court's attention is invited in particular to the
transcript of proceedings of the district court (pages 1 to
31 inclusive). This transcript of proceedings in the district court was filed with this court pursuant to an Order
obtained by the re·spondent herein, which transcript,
rather than the minute entries, is the proper record for
appeal. Said record will be referred to as "Supplemental
Transcript."
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POIN'T I
THE TRIAL COURT, AFTER RECEIVING APPELLANT'S PLEA· OF GUI~TY, PROPERLY PLACED DEFENDANT ON PROBATION AND SUSPENDED IMPOSITION OF
SENTENCE PENDING AN INVESTIGATION BY DISTRICT
PROBATION AGENT.
1. There is no requirement that, upon a plea of guilty, judgment be pronounced and sentence imposed before the
defendant may be placed on probation.
2. Pronouncement of judgment and sentence may be postponed to a day certain where it becomes incidentally
necessary in the administration of justice or to enable
the court to better determine proper punishment.
3. The trial court did not lose jurisdiction in exercising
its discretion not to pronounce judgment and sentence
within ten days after receiving defendant's plea of guilty.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT SUFFICIENTLY SET FORTH THE
TERMS, CONDITIONS, AND LENGTH OF THE PERIOD OF
PROBATION.

4
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT LOSE JURISDICTION
OF THE DEFENDANT BY POSTPONING THE PRO. NOUNCEl\IENT OF SENTENCE NOR DID IT THEREBY
DIS ....\.BLE ITSELF TO REVOKE PROBATION AFTER FINDING TIL.-i.T 'I'HE APPELLANT HAD VIOLATED THE TERMS
THEREO~ WHICH FINDING WAS PROPER .

.A.RGUJ\IENT

POIN'T I
THE TRIAL COURT, AFTER RECEIVING APPELLANT'S PLE ...L\ OF GUILTY, PROPERLY PLACED DEFENDANT ON PROBATION AND SUSPENDED IMPOSITION OF
SENTE}JCE PENDING AN INVESTIGATION BY DISTRICT
PROBATION AGENT.

Appellant, in his brief, challenges the validity and
enforceability of an order placing a defendant on probation after he has entered a plea of guilty to the Information and before judgment and sentence has been pronounced or there has been what appellant terms a "formal
adjudication of guilt".
we agree with appellant that a plea of "guilty" may
be compared to a jury verdict of guilty to the extent that
proper motions well founded and taken, if sustained as to·
proof, might prevent the plea from ever becoming the
foundation for a judgment and sentence. Following that
reasoning we go further and contend that under Section
105-36-17 Utah Code Annotated 1943 (now 77-35-17 Utah
Code Annotated 1953) the plea of guilty, under prope-r
circumstances and conditions, may never become, merged
into the higher right of action of a judgment and sentence; but rather, that plea may be set aside upon the
satisfactory compliance with the conditions of a p~robation

5
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upon which the defendant may he placed after entering
his plea of guilty. Section 105-36-17 (now 77-35-17) reads
as follows:
. "Upon a plea of guilty or conviction of any
crime or offense, if it app-ears compatible with the
public interest, the court having jurisdiction may
suspend the imposition or the execution of sentence and may place the defendant on probation
for such period of time as the court shall determine.
The court may subsequently increase or decrease the probat1on period, and may revoke or
modify any condition of probation. While on
probation, the defendant may. be required to pay,
in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the
time of being placed on probation; may be required to make restitution or reparation to the
aggrieved party or parties for the actual damage~
or losses caused by the offense to which the defendant has pleaded guilty or for which conviction
was had; and may be required to provide for
the support of his wife or others for whose support he may be legally liable. Where it appears
to the court from the report of the probation agent
in charge of the defendant, or otherwise, that the
defendant has complied with the conditions of such
probation, the court may if it be compatible with
the public interest either· upon motion of the district attorney or of its own motion terminate the
sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or conviction of the defendant, and dismis'S the action and
discharge the defendant."
] t is entirely ·clear under that p~rovision that the. trial
court may, after receivi~g a plea of guilty, and without
further proceedings, place a defendant upon probation,
suspending the imposition of sentence until such time as
6
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the tern1 and c.onditions thereof shall haYe been p·roperly
met and fulfilled, or until a breaeh of those tenns and
conditions require~, in the interest of justice, a revocation
of the probation thus granted, the imposition of sentence,
and the cormnitn1ent of defendant to prison.
1. There is no requirement that, upon a plea of guilty,
judgment be pronounced and sentence imposed before the defendant may be placed on probation.
'

'

We cannot agree that, before a defendant· may he
placed on probation there is a requirement for "formal
adjudication of guilt". The language of Section 105-36-17
(77-35-17) clearly indicates that after a plea of guilty
and prior to the "adjudication of guilt", the prop.er .circumstances being present, the court ma.y place a defendr
ant on probation. The express wording of the statute
"Upon a plea of guilty * * * the court h·aving
jurisdiction may suspend the imposition or the
execution of sentence and may place the defendant
on probation * * *'-' (Italics added).
would permit no other construction than that the court
may suspend the pronouncement of judgment and sentence for "such period of time a~ the court shall determine."
The terms "judgment" and "sentence" have been used
in the law and in legal writings interchangably, alternatively, and synonymously. The term "judgment", when
used in sp·eaking of the judgment rendered agains~ a de.fendant in criminal p·roceedings, means the proceeding
of declaring ·the defendant's p11!J'bishment. Bugbee vs.
Boyce, 35 A. 330 66 Vt. 311; the "judgment" is the se!Yir
t~nce of the court upon the verdict or finding of guilty.

7
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People v.s. Markharn, 99 N.Y.S. 109'2, 114 App. Div. 387
A "judgment" has been described as the "sentence of the
law". See Words and 'Phrases, Perm. Ed. Vol. 23, Page
164, 165 and pages 212, 213.
Apvellant in his brief asserts that there ~ust be a
for1nal adjudication of guilt before a defendant may be
placed on probation, and if there is no formal adjudication of guilt, by a postponement of the imposition of sentence, the court loses jurisdiction of the defendant. The
appellant cites no authority for the language in page 17
of his brief which he describes as being the proper mechanics for an adjudication of guilt. Appellant cites
State ex rel Echtle vs. Card and State ex rel SaUee vs.
Card, 268 Pac. 869. These cases have no application here
and do not stand, as cited by appellant, for the proposition that all orders of stay or suspension must be based
upon a formal adjudication of guilt, but rather those
cases hold that all orders, to he valid, must be written, not
orally p~ronounced, thus having no bearing here.

A construction of the phrase "suspension of imposition of sentence" is all that is required in order to meet
app~ellant's contentions in this regard. Words and Phrase'S,
Perm. Ed., Vol. 20, Page 27·8, defines the phrase, "suspending imposition of sentence" as follows: "Suspend"
meaning to seize for a time; hinder f;rom proceeding,
interrupt; stay; delay; to hold' undetermined. "Impose"
means to lay on, and "imposition" a placing or laying on;
"imposition of sentence" the laying on of sentence on defendant or the~ act of sentencing. Kriebel vs. United
States, C.C.A. Ill. 10 F:ed. 2d 762 and 763. Therefore,

8
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to suspend the in1position of sentence is equivalent and
commensurate to the postpone1nent or arrest of judgment.
Words and Phrases, Perm. Ed., Vol. 40, Pages 927 and
928, construes suspension of the sentence as being a suspension of jfidgment which contemplates the postponement of rendition of judgment. "S.usp,ension of the sen.tence" postpones the judgment of the court while the conviction and liability following it, together with disabilities,
remain to become operative upon sentence being given.
People vs. Stickle, 121 N.W. 49-7, 156 Mich. 557, Huggins
vs. Caldwell, 3 S.W. 1101, 223 Ky. 468, .Ex parte Dearo
(California), 214 P. 2d. 585.
The appellant's argument therefore, that there must
be a separate adjudication of guilt preceding probation,
is entirely without merit.
It should be noted that appellant cites Section 10536-17 (now 77-35-17) also, but cites said section p·rior to
its amendment We respectfully submit that as a result,
all appellant's. argument based thereunder is defective
and lacks any force whatsoe.ver, because the subsequent
amendment changed the statute completely with respect
to the instant facts.. The· amendment of this statute
brought about several major changes which, when compared with the statute prior to its amendment, are controlling in the case at bar. Prior to the amendment and
as cited hy appellant, the statute allowed the invocation
· of probation by the court:
Upon conviction of any crime or offense * * *.
After the amendment, probation could be invoked by
the court:
9
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Upon a plea of guilty or conviction of any
crime or offense* * * (Italics added).
Further, the amendment was supplemented with ·the following language not pTesent in the statute prior to
amendment and as cited by appellant:
* * * Where it appears to the court from the
probation agent in charge of the defendant or
otherwise that the defendant has complied with
the conditions of such probation, the court may,
if it be ·compatible with the public interest, either
upon motion of the District Attorney, or of it::,
own motion, terminate the sentence or set aside
the plea of guilty or conviction of thH defendant
and dismiss the action and discharge the defendant.
Prior to amendment, the sole enabling condition to
the imposition of probation upon a defendant was "upon
conviction of any crime or offense * * *." Under the
amended section, probation may be invoked upon a plea
of guilty or conviction, and by adding the foHowing
1natter to the section :
* * * [after successful probationary period]
the court may * * * (1) termilnate the sentence or
(2) set aside the plea o.f guilty.
the legislature has provided correlative means of expunging the record of defendant's guilt if he stands (1) guilty
by conviction, judgment, and sentence or (2) guilty by
plea.
By providing those two avenues of expurgating the
record as to a defendant's guilt and removing the disabilities incident to his guilt, the .legislature, in amending the statute;has clearly evidenced itsintent to allow

10
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courts the discretion of formally passing judgment on
defendant and suspending the e:recution thereof or, in
the alternative, to suspend the proceed·i.ng for the judgment and sentence of defendant by not applying to the
finding of guilt the adjudication and sentence following
that finding.
It is definite and certain under Section 105-36-17
~77-35-17) that judg1nent and sentence is not a condition
precedent to probation.
2. Pronouncement of judgment and sentence may be
postponed to a day certain where it beco1nes inci- dentally necessary in the administration of justice
or to enable the court to better deter1nine proper
punishment.

The authorities are ample in sup·port of the proposition that, the administration of justice requiring it,
pronouncement of sentence may be postponed beyond
the number of days fixed by a regulatory statute for
procedure. Appellant contends that the trial court failed
to comply with S-ection 105-36-1 (now 77-35-1)
After a plea or verdict of guilty, or after a
verdict against the defendant on a plea of a former conViction or acquittal or once in jeop,ardy,
if the judgment is not arrested or a new trial
granted, the court must appoint a time for pronouncing judgment, which must be at least two
days and not more than ten days after the verdict.
and in failing so to do, lost the power and jurisdiction to
adjudicate the gu_ilt and sentence, and p·redicate upon that
adjudication an orde~ for probation. Appellant asserts
the more serious consequence of entirely lo'Sing jurisdic-·
tion over the appellant for all p-urposes. The question of
- 11
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the necessity of an order for probation being based upon
judgment of guilt or sentence has been treated under sub-·
heading 1 in the argument of this point. Many of the
conside·rations here are the same.
Upon the premises that adjudication of guilt need
not precede an order for probation, and that one of the
compelling reasons for that rule is to mote expeditiously
erase the finding of guilt after a defendant responds with
satisfaction to probation, then it would clearly follow that
there would be no need to enter the judgment and sentence formally during the investigatory and supervisory
period. · If the subject of probation is found unfit for, or ·
fails to respond satisfactorily to, the probation so ordered, then, upon the happening of that, the condition subsequent, would be the proper time to impress upon the record the judgment and imposition of sentence.
However, upon grounds much stronger and yet
wholly unrelated to the foregoing considerations, th(~
courts have been declared to have the authority to suspend .or postpone pronouncement of judgment indefinitely and, a fortiori, to a day certain. In Ellerbrake vs.
Kmg, 116 F:ed. 2d 168, the imposing of sentence eight
months after the defendant pleaded guilty was within the
discretion of the·court when it was deemed advisable to
inve-stigate the surrounding circumstances in order to ob. tain information as to the p·rincipals in a series of interstate freight thefts. The Circuit Court of Appe.als in
holding that the District Court was veste·d with powe-r to
suspend imposition of sentence indefinitely without losing
jurisdiction said:

12
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Although the Rules of l)ractice and Procedure
in Criminal Cases promulgated by· the Supreme
Court of the United States on May 7, 1934, requiring that sentence be imposed without delay
* * * do not affect this proceeding [as ha:ving been
concluded in the District Court p·rior to that
promulgation]. Even under those rules an exception is noted 'vhere there should be an investigation in the interest of justice before sentence is
in1posed.
That case is infinitely· strong in derogation of appellant's
contention, for in the instant case the continuances and
attending investigations were solely for· the benefit and
behoof of, and not for the purp·ose of finding aggra:vated
charges against the appellant. He may not now complain
of the continuance which was in no way p·rejudicial, but
contrarily, beneficial to himself. In Hayden: vs. W ard:en
United States Penitentiary, McNeil Island, 124 Fed. 2.d,
514, the facts were almost identical to those in this case.
The defendant there was indicted, and on March 26, 1934,
entered a plea of guilty, at which tin1e a motion for p·robation was filed. The Federal District Court granted a
continuance to April 26th and thereafter granted further
continuances. The defendant, while free on his recognizance, was apprehended for commission of another crime.
On August 6th he was sentenced by the F'ederal District
Court on the eha.rges·contained in the original indictment.
On appe·al the Circuit Court held, a.s against the contention that the District Court had no p·orwer to postpone
imposition of sentence, that 'Since the postponements
were for continuances for a definite time that contention
was not well taken.
13
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. In Gillespie vs. Walker, 296 Fed. 330, the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit said:
Federal Courts, as compared with what has
heen the invariable custom since the establishment
of the present judicial system, had been· greatly
·restricted in their action on the subject of suspending sentences and postponing the rendition of
their judgments and the execution of their sentences* *. * (Citing cases) with a view of paroling
or pardoning an accused; they may neverthel~ss
do so where it becomes incidentally necessary in
the administration of justice, * * * for a period
during the term at which the case is tried, .or to
a fixed day or days during the next term of court.
Such is the rule in the F'ederal Courts.
3. The trial court did not lose jurisdiction in exercising
its discretion not to pronounce judgment and sentence within ten days after receiving defendant's
plea of guilty.
The arguments here are similar to those contained
under sub-heading 2 of this point. However, there is a
line of uncontradicted authority holding that the regUlatory statute p·roviding the time within which sentence
shall be pronounced is not mandatory but merely sets out
the procedure for prompt action. Ex parte Hardemoo,
36 Atl. 213, .131 _N.J.L. 257, construes the New Jersey
statute which reads :
It shall he the duty of the trial court to impose sentence upon defendant within forty-five
days after such defendant shall have been convicted of a crime.
The court said that although it is a p·resumption that the
. word "shall" is imperative and not directory, however,
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in this instance, it is n1erely set out as a procedure for ·
prompt action not depriving the court of its di~cretion
nor occasioning the loss of jurisdiction over the defendant's person if not strictly complied with.
In Williatns vs. State, 152 A. 775 9 N.J. Misc. 66,
sentence 'vas not imposed within the statutory period
as prescribed. The court there said :

It is argued that the affect of this le·gislative
enactinent ·is to require the court to impose sentence within thirty days after rendition of verdict,
and that although the defendant in this c~se was
seeking to have his conviction set aside, the court
must impose sentence 'vithin the time required by
law, although it \vas considering the matters in
regard to defendant's motion and thereby lost its
power to impose sentence. Thus, the defendant
could, by trick, defeat the state of its remedy. The
court has wide discretionary power in pe~rforming
the duty of imposing sentence in criminal cases.

and went on to hold that the defendant's contention was
untenable. In 13oykin vs. State, 190 Pac. 2d, 471, the
· court held that where a court in the beginning of a case
has jurisdiction of the subject matter and person of
defendant, there is a presumption of law that such jurisdiction continues and the.burden is on the defendant to
show that the court had lost jurisdiction to pronounce
judgment and sentence and that the trial court may delay
pronouncement of judgment for the p~urpose of determining motions for new trial, in arre~st of judgment,, or
.for other causes.
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POINT II
TI-IE TRIAL COURT SUFFICIENTLY SET FORTH TH~
'l,ERMS, CONDITIONS, AND LENGTH OF THE PERIOD OF'
PROBATION.
Appe~llant

asserts that inasmuch as the court failed
to spe·cify the terms of probation, its lost jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant to subsequently find
that he had violated his probation. On March 19, 1951,
the trial court, after receiving a plea of guilty, placed
the defendant on probation and ordered the defendant
to sign a probation agreement and to obey all orders made
by the Probation Department (Suppl. Tr. 7). At that time
the defendant was asked by the court whether he was willing to accept and do those things and he answered in the
affirmative (Suppl. Tr. p. 7). Pursuant to the court's
Order, a p·rohation agreement was executed by ~he defendant on that date, which agreement specifically sets
forth the terms and conditions of the probation. This
agreement was offered and accepted by the trial court as
the "State's Exhibit A" and reads as follows:
States Ex. A
AGREEMENT
Date March 19, 51
Upon my release I agree to accept the following terms and conditions:
To make regular reports to the Agent in
charge by the fifth of each and every month, or
more often if requested to do so.

Not to change iny place of residence nor to
leave the bounds of this State or any other 'State
in ,vhich I am permitted to live, nor to change my
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place of employ1uent \Yithout first obtaining perInis.sion from the Agent in charge.
Not to drink u~hi.skey, beer, gin, win.e, or other
intoxica.ting bez,era.ges; or frequent places where
the foregoing are sold; a·nd not to ~tse na.rcotic
d rztgs or 11za rij~tana.

Not to associate ·with any p·erson, or persons
of bad repute.
·
Not to have on my person, at any time, deadly,
dangerous, or concealed weapons.
·
To obey
transactions.

allla"~s,

and refrain from all ille·gal

If I am permitted to leave the State of Utah
I will report to the proper officials immediately
upon arrival at my destination, and will notify
the Utah Office of my arrival.
I do solemnly promise and agree to abide by
the foregoing conditions; and hereby acknowledge
that my failure to comply with any of them may be
considered a violation of my parole, p·roba.tion
for which I am subject to be returned as a parole,
probation violator.

Signed (s) Donald Fedder
Street N·o. 3935 Evelyn Drive
City Ogden, Utah
State Utah
Respondent submits that the trial court defined the
terms of probation by ordering the defendant to exe·cute
a probation agreement and obey the orders of the Probation D-ep-artment, thereby fully. complying with the probation statute. The signature of the defendant on the
probation agreement executed pursuant to the court's
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Order and the defendant's acceptance in open court of
the terms of probation is cohclusive proof, sufficient to
offset the. arguments of the appellant.
Section 105-36-17 ·(77-35-17) provides that the court
may place a defendant on probation for such period of
time as .the co:urt shall determine. It is respectfully submitted that in this instance the court granted the continuances to ap·pellant in order to fully investigate hicl
. eligibility for probation, and in so doing, gave consideration to the possibility of the ~ppellant's full rehabilitation
within a short period of time .. This i.s evidenced by the
trial court's statement (Suppl. Tr. Page 7 and 8):
Don Fedder's case is continued to April 30th
for the imposition of sentence, and he is in your
jurisdiction, (Mr. James A. Larson of the Probation Department) to qecide whether he is to be
held longer or turned loose.
and as evidenced by the Supplemental Transcript, Page

11:
THE COURT: "How long do you 'vant it
continued to~"
MR. LARSON: (District Probation Agent)
"Oh, I think probably until August 13th."
THE COURT: "Alright then, this case is continued for imposition of sentence to August 13,
1951."
Thereafter, all continuances were occasioned by the appellant's failure to appear within the time set by the
court. It is clear that the terms of the probation, both
with respect to the pe·rformance of things required in the
probation agreement, and as to the length of the time of
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probation, as stated in terms of continuanc~s during the
investigatory period, were definite and certain so as to
fully apprise the appellant of his obligations.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID. NOT· LOSE JURISDICTION
OF THE DEFENDANT BY POSTPONING THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF SENTENCE NOR DID IT .THEREBY
DISABLE 'ITSELF TO REVOKE PROBATION AFTER FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT HAD VIOLATED THE TERMS
THEREOF:, WHICH FINDING WAS PROPER.

Williams vs. Harris, Warden 106 Utah 387, 149 P.
2d 640, is a case on all fours with the facts of the case
before us. In that case the defendant, one of four informed against, entered a plea· of guilty in the Third
District Court, on December 12, 1932, and the court then
stated:
Well, the court will suspend the imposition
of sentence. in the case of the four of you, who have
entered a plea of guilty, until Monday, F·ebruary
6th, 1933, at which time you will report back here,
or Mr. Childs (the probation agent) can report
for you, as .to your· conduct. I will place you in
custody· of Mr. Childs and it is up to you gentlemen to straighten up. If you don't straighten out
you will hav~ to come in and be sent to the p·enitentiary, where they will straight~n .you out.
On February 6, 1933, the defendant ap·peared in court
with Mr. Childs and the latte·r made a favorable report
regarding .the hoy's conduct. At this time the District
Attorney stated to the court: "I do not want your Honor
to lose jurisdiction of the boys." The court then made
another order suspending imposition of senten·ce until
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April 24, 1933 and on that
date made a similar order.
,
Several of these were made from a definite date to a
definite date. On October 22, 1933, defendant was
brought before the Judge who had made the previous
orders, who asked defendant regarding his plea to the
charge of burglary and if he had not been sentenced to
the Utah State Prison recently for a crime committed in
Utah County while under the court's order of probation.
Defendant admitted that this was correct. The Judge
then sentenced defendant to be imprisoned for a tern1
of not less than one nor more than twenty years.
This court, after considering the decisions of People
vs. Blackburn, 6 Utah 347, 23 P. 759, and In Re Flint,
25 Utah 338, 71 P. 531, so he~avily· relied upon by appellants herein, and which cases were decided long before
the enactment of the present statute (105-36-17) (now
77-35-17) stated:
It is apparent that 105-36-17 gives the court
much greater latitude and power in suspending
imposition of sentence than was previously had.
* * * The purpose of this section is clearly reformatory. * * * We are of the opinion that the
court purposely continued suspension of sentence
from a day certain to a day certain. * * * We are
of the opinion the trial court acted within the
powers granted by the statute, and that it had
jurisdiction to pronounce sentence to the State
Prison as was done.
In deciding the Williams case, this court affirmed
the theory now adopted by this writer, and expressly
ruled, point by point, against the arguments now urged
again by this appellant. First, that the issues in the
20
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Flint and Blackburn cases, regularly cited in ap·pellant's
brief, have long since becon1e moot by the enactment of
a statute expressly authorizing courts· to susp·end the
imposition of sentence and grant probation, a prerogative
not vested in the courts at the time of those two decisions,
the absence of '\Yhich moved the Utah Supreme Court
to invalidate proceedings in which the-re ha:d been a
palpable attempt to exercise a p·ower not theretofore
granted trial judges. Second, the facts surrounding the
granting of successive continuances, and the form, substance, and ter1ns of the orders p·roviding for those continuances being in the Williams case substantially identical with the continuances and the 'form, substance, and
terrrr.s of the orders for continuance in the case now considered, this court approved and affirmed those proceed- ·
ings. T.hird, this court approved and ratified the imp·o~
sition of terms and conditions of probation of a much
more indefinite character, stated. with less p·articularity
than the terms and conditions imposed hy the trial court
in the instant case. At 149 Pacific 2nd, page 642 [8],
'l~R\'"\-z.ecl
·
this court F . t rtct a those terms impo'Sed upon Win~~.'YY)~:

We

do not believe that the judge when he
placed the boys in the custody of M.r. Childs (the
probation ""agent) eX}>ected the time fixed then to
be a fUll period of probation. The trial judge
was carefUlly feeling his way with these boy8.
l-Ie was endeavoring to save the youths from the
stigma of prison. From what was said and done,
we must conclude that this appellant and the
other boys were released from time· to time under
the condition that they straighten up, that they
do not violate the law. * * * We are of the opinion
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that the court purposefully continued suspension
of ~entence from a day certain to· a day certain
· * * *. We are of the opinion the trial court acted
within the powers granted by the statute (103-3617) and that it had jurisdiction to pronounce sentence to the State Prison as was done. (Ernphasis
added).
It is respectfully submitted that the terms and conditions ~et out by the trial court in the case at bar (Suppl.
Tr. p. 7) were more definite, particular, and better calculated to apprise appellant of what was incumbent upon
him to maintain imposition of sentence in suspension.
The probation agreement signed by appellant (State's
Exhibit "A") implemented the oral instructions . ..c\.s to
the length of the probation period, these term~ were at
least commensurate to those in the Williams case. The
record here shows uncontrovertibly that all continuances
wer~ from a day certain to a day certain. That there
were no laches on the part of the state operating to
prejudice appellant, entitling him to believe his liberty
was not in jeopardy if he violated any stated condition'S.
It is submitted that weaker facts in the Williams case
gave rise to a decision which should control the instant,
stronger case.
All other proceedings in the William'S case vvere
similar to those here. All things that appeared to be
irregularities at first blush in the case at bar, and
grasp.ed by appellant in. his attempt to deprive the trial
court of jurisdiction, were treated in the Williams case
with a resultant affirmance, ratification, and declaration
of the regularity thereof: The abrsence of a sentencing
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of the defendants-referred to by appellant as "judg.:ment of guilt;" the continuances of the respective cases
from fixed days to fixed days; the question of the sufficiency, definiteness, and particularity of the terms and
conditions of the probation; and principally, the p-ower
under the 'Statute granting to a trial court the wide.
discretion .in suspending the . in1position of sentence.
The inescapable result, respondent submits, is that the
Williams case, in June, 1944, effectively concluded all of
the is'Sues no'v- raised and urged upon the same court by
appellail t.
Appellant raises a point in his reference to
In Re Grove, 43 Idaho 775, 254 Pac. 519
worthy of passing corllment. In his quotation from the
case on page 34 of appellant's brief, there appears the
following:
The court did not * * * prescribe any terms
or any ti1ne for withholding judgment, but un~
conditionally released the defendant from custody
and indefinitely withheld the p·ronouncement of
judgment. * * * ·
It immediately appea~ that this case presents. the
identical problem disposed of in the case of State vs.
Zolantakis, 70 Utah 569, 259 Pac. 1044, the overrulin@;
of which by subsequent decisions (Follett vs. Severson,
22·5 Pac. 2d lt16 ; Demmick vs. Harris,
Pac. 2d 170)
has been seriously considered by thitg court. As it
remains on our books, however, that case only holds,
insofar as is material here, that if the probation is one
wit.hout any p!fescribed terms ~)r conditions, and for an
indefinite time, it is a probation upon "good behavior,''

·.m
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and in order to revoke the same and to dep.rive the
parolee or probationer of his liberty, he must be given
an opportunity to be heard and to cross examine at a
hearing appointed· for the purpose of revoking his liberty. That segment of the case becomes immaterial here,
even, e'Specially when it appears that .the defendant was
given notice, of a hearing upon an order to show cause
why his probation should not he revoked, sufficient to
apprise him of the possible consequences thereof, and
adequate enough to enable him to enter a gene·ral appearance in that proceeding by procuring counsel who represented him there, and by filing an affidavit sup:porting
a motion to qua'Sh, set aside, and vacate the or4er. ( Tr.
p. 23-30, Suppl. Tr. p.l8).
·Appellant raise'S, but neither argues nor cites authority for, his point number II, as'Signing as error the
finding of the court that appellant violated probation.
In State vs. Bo~JWa, 106 Utah 55·3, 150 P. 2d 970,
this court held:
A defendant out of prison on probation is
accorded due process of law by the following steps
* * *: (1) the filing of a verified statement or an
affidavit in the case setting forth facts which 'Show
a violation of the terms of p·robation [fully met,
Tr. 20, 21] (2) the citation thereon requiring the
defendant to appear and show cause why probation should not be revoked, apprising defendant of
the grounds upon which revocation is sought, and
specifying a proper time for hearing. (3) a hearing before the court on the question of violation
of some term or condition or probation, at which
the. defendant ha'S the opportunity to cross exam24
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ine 'vitnesses against hi1n and. also to present evidence to refute the claimed violation of the conditions. of probation [Tr. p. 34, Suppl. Tr. pp. 20-31,
sho"'"ing the hearing at which appellant generally
appeared, filing his affidavit in answer ( Sup·pl. Tr.
:26-30) and "Tas represented by counsel] (4) a
determination of the question, followed by entry
of an a.propria.te order [Tr. pp. 35, 36].
Tho~e

requirements were re-affinned in substance in
Christiansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P. 2d 314. There
clearly was no procedural error in the proceedings upon
which the order was based. The evidence p·resented by
the probation agent both in his affidavit and upon the
hearing, uncontroverted, was sufficient upon which to.
base the trial court's finding. (Tr. p·p. 20, 2'1, Sup·pl. Tr.
20-31)
CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that all things and
conditions required to be done, both in acquiring and·
maintaining jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
person of the appellant, and in effectively providing a
proper and enforceable probation, have been had, done,
and met by the trial court. That the trial court has committed no error, nor has it deprived itself of the p:ower
and prerogative to sentence the app·ellant for the crime
to "\vhich he ha'S entered a plea of guilty. That the defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of the court to answer
to the charges contained in the information filed in
this case, and that no part thereof has lapsed, abated,
or been lost. That the court .committed no error in fail25
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mg to quash, vacate,· or set aside the order to show
cau'Se, or in finding that there. was no cause for which
the probation ought not to be revoked, and conunitted
no error in revoking the probation.
Respectfully submitted,

E. R. CALLISTER
A. tt-orney General
KEN CHAMBERLAIN
Assistant A.·ttorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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